Lobbying, Information Transmission, and Unequal Representation

Johan N. M. Lagerlöf () and Lars Frisell
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Lars Frisell: Sveriges Riksbank

Public Economics from EconWPA

Abstract: We study the effects of unequal representation in the interest-group system on the degree of information transmission between a lobbyist and a policymaker. Employing a dynamic cheap-talk model in which the lobbyist cares instrumentally about his reputation for truthtelling, we show that the larger is the inequality, the less information can credibly be transmitted to the policymaker. We also investigate the effects of inequality on welfare and discuss the welfare effects of institutions that increase transparency but which as well, as an unintended side-effect, lower the lobbyist's incentives for truthtelling.

Keywords: lobbying; interest groups; reputation; information transmission; representation; inequality; bias (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D6 D7 H (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic and nep-pbe
Date: Written
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 26; figures: included. The most updated version of the paper can be downloaded at www.JohanLagerlof.org
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http://129.3.20.41/eps/pe/papers/0402/0402003.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Lobbying, Information Transmission, and Unequal Representation (2004)
Working Paper: Lobbying, Information Transmission, and Unequal Representation (2004)
Working Paper: Lobbying, Information Transmission and Unequal Representation (2004)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwppe:0402003

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