Trade, expropriation and allocation

Antonio Quesada ()

Public Economics from EconWPA

Abstract: Allocation rules map preference profiles into allocations, whereas trading rules map preference profiles and allocations into allocations. It is shown that no allocation rule can derive from a trading rule based on voluntary trade and satisfying a weak efficiency condition. If the trading rule allows compulsory trade then the only allocation rules that can derive from a trading rule satisfying certain additional mild conditions are those having a hierarchy of dictators. These results contribute to accentuate the difference between centralized and decentralized allocation mechanisms.

Keywords: Allocation rules; Compulsory trade; Hierarchy of dictators; Trading rules (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D61 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
Date: 2004-07-05
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 13

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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwppe:0407004

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