Arrow's Theorem in Judgement Aggregation

Franz Dietrich and Christian List

Public Economics from EconWPA

Abstract: In response to recent work on the aggregation of individual judgements on logically connected propositions into collective judgements, it is often asked whether judgement aggregation is a special case of Arrowian preference aggregation. We argue the opposite. After proving a general impossibility theorem, we construct an embedding of preference aggregation into judgement aggregation and prove Arrow's theorem as a corollary of our result. Although we provide a new proof of Arrow's theorem, our main aim is to identify the analogue of Arrow's theorem in judgement aggregation, to clarify the relation between judgement and preference aggregation and to illustrate the generality of the judgement aggregation model.

Keywords: judgement aggregation; formal logic; preference aggregation; Arrow's Theorem; discursive dilemma (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D70 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dcm
Date: 2005-04-22, Revised 2005-09-10
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 10
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http://129.3.20.41/eps/pe/papers/0504/0504007.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Arrow’s theorem in judgment aggregation (2005)
Working Paper: Arrow’s theorem in judgment aggregation (2005)
Journal Article: Arrow’s theorem in judgment aggregation (2007)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwppe:0504007

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