Judgment aggregation in general logics

Franz Dietrich

Public Economics from EconWPA

Abstract: Within social choice theory, the new field of judgment aggregation aims to merge many individual sets of judgments on logically interconnected propositions into a single collective set of judgments on these propositions. Commonly, judgment aggregation is studied using standard propositional logic, with a limited expressive power and a problematic representation of conditional statements ('if P then Q') as material conditionals. In this methodological paper, I present a generalised model, in which most realistic decision problems can be represented. The model is not restricted to a particular logic but is open to several logics, including standard propositional logic, predicate calculi, modal logics and conditional logics. To illustrate the model, I prove an impossibility theorem, which generalises earlier results.

Keywords: judgement aggregation; discursive dilemma; modelling methodology; formal logics; impossibility theorem (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D6 D7 H (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm
Date: 2005-05-18
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 23
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Journal Article: A generalised model of judgment aggregation
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwppe:0505007

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