On the equivalence of the Arrow impossibility theorem and the Brouwer fixed point theorem (forthcoming in ``Applied Mathematics and Computation''(Elsevier))

Yasuhito Tanaka ()

Public Economics from EconWPA

Abstract: We will show that in the case where there are two individuals and three alternatives (or under the assumption of free-triple property) the Arrow impossibility theorem for social welfare functions that there exists no social welfare function which satisfies transitivity, Pareto principle, independence of irrelevant alternatives, and has no dictator is equivalent to the Brouwer fixed point theorem on a 2-dimensional ball (circle).

JEL-codes: D6 D7 H (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hpe and nep-pbe
Date: 2005-06-16, Revised 2005-06-17
Note: Type of Document - pdf
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwppe:0506012

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