A topological approach to the Arrow impossibility theorem when individual preferences are weak orders (forcoming in ``Applied Mathematics and Compuation''(Elsevier))

Yasuhito Tanaka ()

Public Economics from EconWPA

Abstract: We will present a topological approach to the Arrow impossibility theorem of social choice theory that there exists no binary social choice rule (which we will call a social welfare function) which satisfies the conditions of transitivity, independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA), Pareto principle and non-existence of dictator.

JEL-codes: D6 D7 H (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dcm and nep-pbe
Date: 2005-06-16, Revised 2005-06-17
Note: Type of Document - pdf
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwppe:0506013

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