A MODEL OF CORRUPTION IN AN INVESTMENT PROJECT

Soumyen Sikdar and Sarbajit Chaudhuri ()
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Soumyen Sikdar: Dept. of Economics, Calcutta University, India

Public Economics from EconWPA

Abstract: The present paper analyzes the phenomenon of corruption in the context of a Public Works Department (PWD) in a developing country city and examines its tenacity in the face of anticorruption measures. Different behaviour patterns of the supervisor (official) of the PWD have been considered. The interesting result to emerge is that corruption may show a high degree of robustness against marginal attacks and such measures may actually be counterproductive in the different cases considered in this paper.

Keywords: Corruption; investment project; supervisor; contractor; bribe; anticorruption measures (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D72 H54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pbe and nep-reg
Date: Written 2005-10-23
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 12
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