Unidimensional Voting and Multidimensional Issues: The Role of Interest Groups

Harvey James ()

Public Economics from EconWPA

Abstract: Voting on unidimensional issues will produce equilibrium outcomes if voter preferences are single peaked. While the equilibrium outcomes would not necessarily be Pareto optimal, they would be stable. This paper shows that voting on multidimensional issues can produce stable equilibria if the voting occurs in one "super" ideological dimension. However, interest groups that expect to lose the ideological vote have an incentive to disrupt the voting process by arguing that the voting should not be ideological.

Keywords: voting cycles; interest groups; social choice theory; preferences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1996-12-10
Note: Type of Document - Word 7.0; prepared on IBM PC Pentium running Windows95; to print on HP laserjet 4; pages: 7; figures: none

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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwppe:9612001

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