Non-welfare economics and the well-being of phantom agents: an appeal to caution

Bart Capéau () and Erwin Ooghe ()

Public Economics Working Paper Series from Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Centrum voor Economische Studiën, Working Group Public Economics

Abstract: Besley (1988) is one of the few exceptional articles containing non-welfarist optimal tax devices. Feehan(1990) reports an error in his first-best rules. The present note criticizes the fundamentals of Besley's second-best rules. These rules optimize the welfare or well-being of phantom agents rather than the corrected welfare of real existing agents in society.

Date: 2001
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Published in abbreviated form under the title "Merit goods and phantom agents" in Economics Bulletin, Vol. 8, No. 8, pp. 1-5.

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