Imitation and the Emergence of Nash Equilibrium Play in Games with Many Players

Edward John Cartwright ()

The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) from University of Warwick, Department of Economics

Abstract: We model a learning dynamic in which players imitate and innovate. Of interest is to question whether Nash equilibrium play emerges, and if so, the role that imitation plays in this emergence. Our main result provides a general class of coordination games for which approximate Nash equilibrium play does emerge. Important conditions include that players imitate "similar" individuals. The role of imitation in learning is discussed in the context of two examples where it is shown that imitation can lead to pareto superio outcomes.

Keywords: imitation; best reply; convergence; Nash equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wrk:warwec:684

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