Conformity and Bounded Rationality in Games with Many Players

Edward John Cartwright () and Myrna Wooders ()

The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) from University of Warwick, Department of Economics

Abstract: Intepret a set of players all playing the same pure strategy and all with similar attributes as a society. Is it consistent with self interested behaviour for a population to organise itself into a relatively small number of societies? In a companion paper we characterized how large " must be, in terms of parameters describing individual games, for an equilibrium to exhibit conformity in pure strategies. In this paper we provide a wide class of games where such conformity is boundedly rational, that is, where " can be chosen to be small.

Date: 2003
View list of references View citations in EconPapers

Downloads: (external link)
http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/resear ... cations/twerp687.pdf

Related works:
Working Paper: Conformity and Bounded Rationality in Games with Many Players (2003)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wrk:warwec:687

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) from University of Warwick, Department of Economics
Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by Margaret Nash ().