Women’s Earning Power and the “Double Burden” of Market and Household Work

Natalie Chen, Paola Conconi () and Carlo Perroni
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Natalie Chen: University of Warwick and CEPR
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Natalie Xinyu Chen and Natalie A. Chen ()

The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) from University of Warwick, Department of Economics

Abstract: Bargaining theory predicts that married women who experience a relative improvement in their labor market position should experience a comparative gain within their marriage. However, if renegotiation possibilities are limited by institutional mechanisms that achieve long-term commitment, the opposite may be true, particularly if women are specialized in household activities and the labor market allows comparatively more flexibility in their labor supply responses. Evidence from the German Socio-Economic Panel indeed shows that, as long as renegotiation opportunities are limited, comparatively better wages for women exacerbate their “double burden” of market and household work.

Keywords: Marriage; Bargaining; Renegotiation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D1 J2 J3 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-lab
Date: 2007
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Related works:
Working Paper: Women's Earning Power and the "Double Burden" of Market and Household Work (2007)
Working Paper: Women's Earning Power and the 'Double Burden' of Market and Household Work (2007)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wrk:warwec:800

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