Rage Against the Machines - How Subjects Learn to Play Against Computers

Peter Dürsch, Albert Kolb, Jörg Oechssler and Burkhard Schipper ()
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Albert Kolb: Department of Economics, University of Bonn, Postal: Adenauerallee 24, D-53113 Bonn

No 05-36, Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications from Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim

Abstract: We use an experiment to explore how subjects learn to play against computers which are programmed to follow one of a number of standard learning algorithms. The learning theories are (unbeknown to subjects) a best response process, fictitious play, imitation, reinforcement learning, and a trial & error process. We test whether subjects try to influence those algorithms to their advantage in a forward-looking way (strategic teaching). We find that strategic teaching occurs frequently and that all learning algorithms are subject to exploitation with the notable exception of imitation. The experiment was conducted, both, on the internet and in the usual laboratory setting. We find some systematic differences, which however can be traced to the different incentives structures rather than the experimental environment.

New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo and nep-exp
Date: 2005-10-24
Note: Financial support from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, SFB 504, at the University of Mannheim, is gratefully acknowledged.
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Related works:
Working Paper: Rage Against the Machines: How Subjects Learn to Play Against Computers (2005)
Working Paper: Rage Against the Machines: How Subjects Learn to Play Against Computers (2005)
Working Paper: Rage Against the Machines: How Subjects Learn to Play Against Computers (2005)
Working Paper: Rage Against the Machines: How Subjects Learn to Play Against Computers (2005)
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