Abstract:
This paper uses a very simple example (two goods, linear symmetric demand and cost) to study the effects of the price cap regulatory mechanism. We show that if a given price vector is preferred (using current welfare as the criterion) to another, then it is not necessarily the case that it is also preferred in the long run (using the presented discounted value of welfare as the criterion). The relationship between current welfare and profit and therefore the firm's incentive to bargain for a given price vector depend on the specific details of the mechanism considered.
More papers in Discussion Papers from Department of Economics, University of York Address: Department of Economics and Related Studies, University of York, York, YO10 5DD, United Kingdom Contact information at EDIRC. Series data maintained by Michael Shallcross ().
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