Courts: The Lex Mundi Project

Andrei Shleifer, Simeon Djankov (), Rafael La Porta () and Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes ()

Yale School of Management Working Papers from Yale School of Management

Abstract: In cooperation with Lex Mundi member law firms in 109 countries, we measure and describe the exact procedures used by litigants and courts to evict a tenant for non-payment of rent and to collect a bounced check. We use these data to construct an index of procedural formalism of dispute resolution for each country. We find that such formalism is systematically greater in civil than in common law countries. Moreover, procedural formalism is associated with higher expected duration of judicial proceedings, more corruption, less consistency, less honesty, less fairness in judicial decisions, and inferior access to justice. These results suggest that legal transplantation may have led to an inefficiently high level of procedural formalism, particularly in developing countries.

JEL-codes: K40 K41 K42 O10 K10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002-03-19
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Related works:
Working Paper: Courts: The Lex Mundi project (2002)
Working Paper: Courts: The Lex Mundi Project (2002)
Working Paper: Courts: the Lex Mundi Project (2002)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ysm:somwrk:ysm277

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