Catalytic Finance: When Does It Work?

Stephen Morris () and Hyun Song Shin ()
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Hyun Song Shin: University of London, London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE), Department of Accounting and Finance

Yale School of Management Working Papers from Yale School of Management

Abstract: n a simple model of currency crises caused by creditor coordination failure, we show that bailouts that reduce ex post inefficiency will sometimes create ex ante moral hazard but will sometimes enhance the incentives for governments to take preventative actions. This model helps us understand a debate about the role of the IMF in catalyzing lending to developing countries.

Keywords: Moral Hazard; Financial Crisis; International Financial Architecture; Global Games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 F33 C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-fin
Date: 2004-07-28
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Related works:
Working Paper: Catalytic Finance: When Does It Work? (2003)
Journal Article: Catalytic finance: When does it work? (2006)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ysm:somwrk:ysm339

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