Coordination, Communication and Common Knowledge: A Retrospective on the Electronic Mail Game

Stephen Morris ()

Yale School of Management Working Papers from Yale School of Management

Abstract: Common knowledge plays an important role in coordination problems and coordination problems are central to many areas of economic policy. In this paper, I review some common knowledge puzzles culminating in the electronic mail game. These puzzles may seem distant from practical concerns. However, I then argue why insights derived from this literature are useful in interpreting empirical evidence of how people coordinate under uncertainty and in understanding the role of communication in coordinating behaviour.

Keywords: Common Knowledge; Coordination; Communication (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D8 C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-07-28
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Journal Article: Coordination, Communication, and Common Knowledge: A Retrospective on the Electronic-mail Game (2002)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ysm:somwrk:ysm340

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