Dynamic Price Competition

Dirk Bergemann () and Juuso Valimaki ()
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Juuso Valimaki: Helsinki School of Economics & Business Administration

Yale School of Management Working Papers from Yale School of Management

Abstract: We consider the model of price competition for a single buyer among many sellers in a dynamic environment. The surplus from each trade is allowed to depend on the path of previous purchases, and as a result, the model captures phenomena such as learning by doing and habit formation in consumption characterize Markovian equilibria for finite and infinite horizon versions of the model and show that the stationary infinite horizon version of the model possesses an equilibrium where all the sellers receive an equilibrium payoff equal to their marginal contribution to the social welfare.

Keywords: Dynamic Competition; Marginal Contribution; Markov Perfect Equilibrium; Common Agency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D83 D81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-ind
Date: 2004-07-28

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Related works:
Working Paper: Dynamic Price Competition (2003)
Journal Article: Dynamic price competition (2006)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ysm:somwrk:ysm360

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