On Local and Network Games

Martin Shubik and Thomas Quint ()
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Thomas Quint: University of Nevada, Reno

Yale School of Management Working Papers from Yale School of Management

Abstract: The knowledge constraints and transactions costs imposed by geographical distance, network connections and time conspire to justify local behavior as a good approximation for global rationality. We consider a class of games to illustrate this relationship and raise some questions as to what constitutes a satisfactory solution concept.

Keywords: Local Games; Network Games; Advertising (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 D89 M39 C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com
Date: 2004-07-28

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Working Paper: On Local and Network Games (2003)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ysm:somwrk:ysm361

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