The Edgeworth, Cournot and Walrasian Cores

Martin Shubik

Yale School of Management Working Papers from Yale School of Management

Abstract: Three variations of the core of a market game representing an exchange economy are considered and compared. The possibility for utilizing the Walrasian core to reflect certain monetary phenomena is noted.

Keywords: Market game; strategic market game; exchange economy; core; characteristic function (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D5 C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hpe and nep-mic
Date: Written

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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ysm:somwrk:ysm433

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