Anti-Sharing

Roland Kirstein and Robert Cooter

No 2005-03, CSLE Discussion Paper Series from Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics

Abstract: Anti-Sharing may solve the sharing problem of teams: the team members promise a fixed payment to the Anti-Sharer. He collects the actual output and pays out its value to them. We prove that the internal Anti-Sharer is unproductive in equilibrium. -- Anti-Sharing kann das Teilungsproblem der Teamproduktion lösen: Die Teammitglieder versprechen dem Antisharer zunächst einen fixen Betrag. Der Anti-Sharer bekommt den tatsächlichen Teamoutput und zahlt dessen Wert an jedes Teammitglied aus (vermindert um die fixe Zahlung). Wir zeigen, daß der Anti-Sharer im Gleichgewicht unproduktiv ist.

Keywords: team production; sharing problem; bonding; theory of the firm (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 L23 D23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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http://econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/23074/1/2005-03_antisharing.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Anti-Sharing (2003)
Working Paper: Anti-Sharing
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:csledp:200503

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