Voluntary contributing in a neighborhood public good game: An experimental study
Siegfried K. Berninghaus,
Werner Güth and
No 11, Working Paper Series in Economics from Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT), Department of Economics and Business Engineering
In repeated Public Good Games contributions might be influenced by different motives. The variety of motives for deciding between (more or less) free-riding probably explains the seemingly endless tradition of theoretical and experimental studies of repeated Public Good Games. To more clearly distinguish the motives, we try to enrich the choice set by allowing players not only to contribute but also to locate their contribution to one of the player positions. The location choice affects what individual players gain, but not the overall efficiency of contributing, and allows for discrimination, e.g., rewarding and sanctioning co-players differently. Our experimental results show that adding location choice promotes voluntary cooperation, although discrimination itself has no signifficant effect on behavior.
Keywords: Public Good Game; Neighborhood; Cooperation; Experimental Analysis (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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