Reputation and Imperfectly Observable Commitment: The Chain Store Paradox Revisited

B. Adolph and Elmar Wolfstetter ()

No 1996,85, SFB 373 Discussion Papers from Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes

Date: 1996
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