Intrafirm conflicts and interfirm competition

Werner Güth, Kerstin Pull and Manfred Stadler

No 14, University of Tuebingen Working Papers in Economics and Finance from University of Tuebingen, Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences

Abstract: We study strategic interfirm competition allowing for internal conflicts in each seller firm. Intrafirm conflicts are captured by a multi-agent framework with principals implementing a revenue sharing scheme. For a given number of agents, interfirm competition leads to a higher revenue share for the agents, higher equilibrium effort levels and higher agent utility, but lower profits for the firms. The winners from antitrust policy are thus not only the consumers but also the agents employed by the competing firms. --

Keywords: agency theory; strategic interfirm competition; revenue sharing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 L22 M52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-com and nep-gth
Date: 2011
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Related works:
Working Paper: Intra-firm Conflicts and Interfirm Competition (2009)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:tuewef:14

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