On the profitability of collusion in location games
Zur Profitabilität von Kollusion in Standortspielen
Steffen Huck (),
Vicki Knoblauch () and
No FS IV 02-22, Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance from Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB)
In this note we take a first step towards the analysis of collusion in markets with spatial competition, focusing on the case of pure location choices. We find that collusion can only be profitable if a coalition contains more than half of all players. This result holds for location games played in k-dimensional Euclidean space as long as consumers are distributed via atomless density functions. For competition on the unit interval, unit circle, and unit square we also derive sufficient conditions for collusion to be profitable.
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Journal Article: On the profitability of collusion in location games (2003)
Working Paper: On the profitability of collusion in location games (2003)
Working Paper: On the profitability of collusion in location games (2000)
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