Moral Property Rights in Bargaining

Simon Gächter () and Arno Riedl

No iewwp113, IEW - Working Papers from Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW

Abstract: In many business transactions, in labor-management relations, in international conflicts, and welfare state reforms bargainers seem to hold strong entitlements that shape negotiations. Despite their importance, the role of entitlements in negotiations has not received much attention. We fill the gap by designing an experiment that allows us to measure the entitlements and to track them through the whole negotiation process. We find strong entitlement effects that shape opening offers, bargaining duration, concessions and reached (dis-)agreements. We argue that entitlements constitute a “moral property right” that is influential independent of negotiators’ legal property rights.

Keywords: Moral property rights; fairness judgments; bargaining with claims; selfserving bias (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A12 D63 C78 C92 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-mic
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Related works:
Working Paper: Moral property rights in bargaining (2002)
Working Paper: Moral Property Rights in Bargaining (2002)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zur:iewwpx:113

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