Deceptively Framed Lotteries in Consumer Markets

Markus Dertwinkel-Kalt, Hans-Theo Normann, Jan-Niklas Tiede and Tobias Werner

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: Consumers often face products sold as lotteries rather than fixed outcomes. A prominent case is the loot box in video games, where players pay for randomized rewards. We investigate how presentation formats shape consumer beliefs and willingness to pay. In an online experiment with 802 participants, sellers could frame lotteries using two common manipulations: censoring outcome probabilities and selectively highlighting rare successes. More than 80\% of sellers adopted such deceptive frames, particularly when both manipulations were available. These choices substantially inflated buyer beliefs and increased willingness to pay of up to six times the expected value. Sellers anticipated this effect and raised prices accordingly. Our results show how deceptive framing systematically shifts consumer beliefs and enables firms to extract additional surplus. For marketing practice, this highlights the strategic value of framing tools in probabilistic selling models; for policy, it underscores the importance of transparency requirements in protecting consumers.

Date: 2025-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-dcm, nep-exp and nep-spo
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://arxiv.org/pdf/2511.01597 Latest version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2511.01597

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Papers from arXiv.org
Bibliographic data for series maintained by arXiv administrators ().