A Comment on the Gibbard–Satterthwaite Theorem

Sandroni Daniel () and Sandroni Alvaro ()
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Sandroni Daniel: Germantown Friends School, 31 W Coulter St, Philadelphia, PA 19144, USA
Sandroni Alvaro: Department of Managerial Economics and Decision Sciences, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL 60208, USA

The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 2025, vol. 25, issue 2, 273-288

Abstract: This paper re-examines the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem when some anomalous choice functions are allowed. We show non-dictatorial social aggregators that limit manipulation and non-dictatorial social aggregators do not permit manipulation.

Keywords: dictatorship; manipulability; WARP (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1515/bejte-2024-0095

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