Managers and Public Hospital Performance

Pablo Muñoz and Cristóbal Otero ()

American Economic Review, 2025, vol. 115, issue 11, 4040-74

Abstract: We study whether the quality of managers can affect public service provision in the context of public health. Using novel data from public hospitals in Chile, we show how the introduction of a competitive recruitment system and better pay for public hospital CEOs reduced hospital mortality by 8 percent. The effect is not explained by a change in patient composition. We find that the policy changed the pool of CEOs by displacing doctors with no management training in favor of CEOs who had studied management. Productivity improvements were driven by hospitals that recruited higher quality CEOs.

JEL-codes: D24 G34 I11 I18 J45 M54 O15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1257/aer.20240615

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