Agency Costs, Ownership, and Internal Governance Mechanisms: Evidence from Chinese Listed Companies
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Ratnam Vijayakumaran: Durham University Business School, Durham University, Durham, UK and Department of Financial Management, Faculty of Management Studies and Commerce, University of Jaffna, Sri Lanka
Asian Economic and Financial Review, 2019, vol. 9, issue 1, 133-154
In recent years, there has been an increasing interest in assessing the effectiveness of corporate governance in China. This paper examines the impact of internal governance mechanisms such as ownership structure and board characteristics and debt financing on agency costs making use of a large panel of Chinese listed firms. We find that managerial ownership and debt financing work as effective corporate governance mechanisms for Chinese listed firms to mitigate agency conflicts and the resultant agency costs.
Keywords: Agency costs; Ownership structure; Board structure; Debt financing; State ownership; China. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D22 G32 G34 G38 G39 L25 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:asi:aeafrj:2019:p:133-154
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