Solidarity and Probabilistic Target Rules
Lars Ehlers and
Bettina Klaus ()
Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2001, vol. 3, issue 2, 167-84
We consider a probabilistic approach to collective choice problems where a group of agents with single-peaked preferences have to decide on the level or location of a public good. We show that every probabilistic rule that satisfies Pareto efficiency and "solidarity" (population-monotonicity or replacement-domination) must equal a so-called target rule. Copyright 2001 by Blackwell Publishing Inc.
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