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Stable Provision vs. Cournot-Nash Equilibria in Pure Public Good Economies

Benyamin Shitovitz and Menahem Spiegel

Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2001, vol. 3, issue 2, 219-24

Abstract: Shitovitz and Spiegel (1998) demonstrated that in pure public good economies, for some consumers the Lindahl consumption bundles can be inferior (utility-wise) to their Cournot-Nash allocation. In this paper, we prove that in any finite pure public good economy there exists a core allocation that is unanimously preferred, utility-wise, by all consumers over their Cournot-Nash consumption bundles. Copyright 2001 by Blackwell Publishing Inc.

Date: 2001
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Handle: RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:3:y:2001:i:2:p:219-24