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Composition of Government Budget, Non-single Peakedness, and Majority Voting

Peter Bearse, Gerhard Glomm () and Eckhard Janeba ()

Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2001, vol. 3, issue 4, 471-81

Abstract: In this paper we study whether majority voting equilibria exist when preferences over public policies are not single peaked. The government levies a proportional income tax. Tax revenue is used to finance a uniform lump-sum transfer and public education. Individuals vote on the composition of the government budget. We show that the single-crossing property cannot be invoked to establish existence of a majority voting equilibrium. In a simple parametric example we find that cycles are pervasive. Copyright 2001 by Blackwell Publishing Inc.

Date: 2001
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Working Paper: Composition of Government Budget, Non-Single Peakedness and Majority Voting (1999)
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