Changing the Social Norm of Tax Compliance by Voting
James Alm (),
Gary H McClelland and
William D Schulze
Kyklos, 1999, vol. 52, issue 2, 141-71
This paper argues that there is a social norm of tax compliance that affects individual reporting decisions and that can be affected by voting on different aspects of the fiscal system. Experimental results are consistent with a central role for social norms. Individual compliance after a vote is decidedly different from prevote compliance under the identical fiscal regime, in particular, compliance always falls dramatically after the group signals its rejection of the social norm by voting against greater enforcement. However, the results also suggest that social norms can be affected by group communication; in particular, postvote reporting with communication approaches full compliance. Copyright 1999 by WWZ and Helbing & Lichtenhahn Verlag AG
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations View citations in EconPapers (139) Track citations by RSS feed
There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:kyklos:v:52:y:1999:i:2:p:141-71
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0023-5962
Access Statistics for this article
Kyklos is currently edited by Rene L. Frey
More articles in Kyklos from Wiley Blackwell
Series data maintained by Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing ().