Economics at your fingertips  

Tax Evasion and Voting: An Experimental Analysis

Lars Feld () and Jean-Robert Tyran ()

Kyklos, 2002, vol. 55, issue 2, 197-222

Abstract: The puzzle of tax compliance is why people pay taxes instead of evading them: given the low expected fines, rational taxpayers should decide to underreport taxable income. However, most taxpayers truthfully declare their income to the tax authorities, a behaviour that is usually explained by tax morale. In this paper, we study in an experimental setting which factors shape tax morale. The main result is that the higher legitimacy of an endogenous fine as compared to an exogenously determined fine leads to higher tax compliance. This result is robust to competing explanations like commitment, and reciprocity as two motivations accompanying group decision making. Copyright 2002 by WWZ and Helbing & Lichtenhahn Verlag AG

Date: 2002
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations View citations in EconPapers (123) Track citations by RSS feed

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link:

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0023-5962

Access Statistics for this article

Kyklos is currently edited by Rene L. Frey

More articles in Kyklos from Wiley Blackwell
Series data maintained by Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing ().

Page updated 2018-03-21
Handle: RePEc:bla:kyklos:v:55:y:2002:i:2:p:197-222