Incitations juridiques versus incitations normatives en présence d'erreurs judiciaires
Bruno Deffains and
Claude Fluet ()
Economie & Prévision, 2013, vol. n° 202-203, issue 1, 19-36
We analyse the complementarity between legal incentives (i.e., the threat of being held liable for damages) and normative incentives (i.e., the fear of social disapproval) in situations where instances of misbehaviour are not perfectly observable. We show that there may be multiple equilibria within a given legal regime, as well as multiple socio-legal equilibria in different legal situations. We argue that this analysis may explain some of the differences between common law and civil law regarding the notions of fault or negligence. Our approach also provides an explanation for trends currently observed in civil law systems, in particular the weakening of evidentiary requirements in tort cases.
Keywords: social interactions; stigma; judicial error; evidentiary standard (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cai:ecoldc:ecop_202_0019
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