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The Rise of ROW Anti-Cartel Enforcement

John Connor ()

Antitrust Chronicle, 2015, vol. 9

Abstract: Although the recent growth of cartel fines in the ROW is impressive, there are at least three important differences between these authorities and the more established antitrust agencies. John Connor (Purdue Univ.)

JEL-codes: K21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Handle: RePEc:cpi:atchrn:9.1.2015:i=19653