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Institutional Design and Federal Antitrust Enforcement Agencies: Renovation or Revolution?

Michael McFalls

CPI Journal, 2014, vol. 10

Abstract: Institutional design, properly defined, both circumscribes and defines the practice of antitrust law in the United States. The structure of antitrust law and enforcement in the United States reflects so many disparate strands of political thought and expression that it seems almost impossible that it could function, much less cohere. But that very mixture of currents and cross-currents is quintessentially American—and keeps the importance of institutional design very much alive and significant in U.S. antitrust law.

JEL-codes: L11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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