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Tying–Still a Competitive Evil

Peter Carstensen

CPI Journal, 2012, vol. 8

Abstract: The central observation is that tying does, in fact, distort the market process and affects adversely both buyers and competitors, actual and potential, of the firm employing the tying device. Peter C. Carstensen (University of Wisconsin)

Keywords: abel mateus; financial regulation; interim report; vickers; competition policy international; shadow banking; governance; antitrust (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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