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Tying and Consumer Harm

Daniel Crane

CPI Journal, 2012, vol. 8

Abstract: The Brantley court was correct in holding that some theory of anticompetitive effect from the tying arrangement that is to say, some theory of how the tying arrangement reduced the market’s competitive- ness should be required in every tying case. Daniel Crane (University of Michigan)

Keywords: Todd Fishman; Olivier Fréget; David Gabathuler; competition policy international; antitrust; financial regulation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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