Economics Of Vertical Restraints For Multi-Sided Platforms
David Evans ()
CPI Journal, 2013, vol. 9
David S. Evans discusses the pro and anticompetitive uses of vertical restraints in multi-sided platforms. His paper notes that vertical restraints can assist in creating value, for example, by aiding in demand consolidation in a single platform or by ensuring a greater supply of liquidity to platform participants. Evans goes on to describe how certain types of restraints can lead to procompetitive benefits or instead be used in an anticompetitive fashion, for example, by preventing a platform from attaining enough demand (critical mass) on one side.
JEL-codes: G38 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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