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Pay-for-Delay

Fiona Scott Morton

CPI Journal, 2013, vol. 9

Abstract: This article lays out the economics of competition between branded and generic pharmaceuticals and its welfare consequences. I explain the logic behind so-called “pay-for-delay†or “reverse payments†in the context of the current IP environment where weak (probabilistic) patents are frequently granted by the PTO. Fiona Scott Morton (Yale University).

Keywords: Fiona Scott Morton; pay-for-delay; reverse payments; competition; antitrust (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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