Ã¢â‚¬Å“Pay-for-DelayÃ¢â‚¬Â: What Do We Disagree On?
Pierre Regibeau ()
CPI Journal, 2013, vol. 9
Antitrust concerns about Ã¢â‚¬Å“pay-for-delayÃ¢â‚¬Â patent settlements are based on two theories of harms, one that stresses the need for courts to review the validity of patents and one that emphasizes the Ã¢â‚¬Å“probabilisticÃ¢â‚¬Â nature of patent rights. Pierre Regibeau (CRA and Imperial College).
Keywords: pay-for-delay; antitrust; pierre regibeau; competition law (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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