Teams formation: Efficiency and approximate fairness

Anna Bogomolnaia, Artem Baklanov and Elizaveta Victorova

Games and Economic Behavior, 2025, vol. 154, issue C, 226-245

Abstract: A set of kn indivisible items is to be allocated to n agents; each agent has to get exactly k items, and agents have additive utilities over bundles. Can one find an efficient and approximately fair allocation? In this setting, we introduce new notions of approximate fairness, based on exchange of two single objects, and compare them to the “traditional” ones based on disregarding one object.

Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:154:y:2025:i:c:p:226-245

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.09.002

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