Economics at your fingertips  

Motivating Whistleblowers

Jeffrey Butler (), Danila Serra () and Giancarlo Spagnolo ()
Additional contact information
Giancarlo Spagnolo: SITE-Stockholm School of Economics, SE- 113 83 Stockholm, Sweden; Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF), 00187 Rome, Italy; University of Rome Tor Vergata, 00133 Rome, Italy; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR), London EC1V 0DX, United Kingdom

Management Science, 2020, vol. 66, issue 2, 605-621

Abstract: Law-breaking activities within firms are widespread but difficult to uncover, making whistleblowing by employees desirable. We investigate if and how monetary incentives and expectations of social approval or disapproval from the public, and their interactions, affect an employee’s decision to blow the whistle when the social damage from the reported misbehavior is more or less salient. Our analysis also has implications for the design and management of firms’ internal whistleblowing channels.

Keywords: whistleblowing; fraud; rewards; social judgment; experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link) (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Motivating Whistleblowers (2017) Downloads
Working Paper: Motivating Whistleblowers (2017) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link:

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Management Science from INFORMS Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Matthew Walls ().

Page updated 2020-11-12
Handle: RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:66:y:2020:i:2:p:605-621