Trading Volume Manipulation and Competition Among Centralized Crypto Exchanges

Dan Amiram (), Evgeny Lyandres () and Daniel Rabetti ()
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Dan Amiram: Coller School of Management, Tel Aviv University, 69978 Tel Aviv, Israel
Evgeny Lyandres: Coller School of Management, Tel Aviv University, 69978 Tel Aviv, Israel
Daniel Rabetti: National University of Singapore Business School, National University of Singapore, Singapore 119245

Management Science, 2025, vol. 71, issue 10, 8604-8622

Abstract: How competition affects manipulation by firms of information about important attributes of their products and how such information manipulation impacts firms’ short-term and long-term performance are open empirical questions. We use a setting that is especially suitable for answering these questions—centralized crypto exchanges, on which information manipulation takes the form of inflated trading volume. We find that static and dynamic competition measures are positively associated with volume inflation, indicating that competition may lead to increased information manipulation. Exchanges that manipulate volume obtain short-run benefits but are punished in the long run, consistent with the trade-off between short-lived increases in rents and future losses because of damaged reputation.

Keywords: crypto exchanges; volume inflation; competition; information manipulation; regulation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:71:y:2025:i:10:p:8604-8622

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