Characterizing the Nash and Raiffa Bargaining Solutions by Disagreement Point Axioms
Hans Peters and
Eric van Damme
Mathematics of Operations Research, 1991, vol. 16, issue 3, 447-461
We provide a new characterization of the n -person Nash bargaining solutions which does not involve Nash's Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives axiom, but mainly uses axioms which concern changes in the disagreement point and leave the feasible set fixed. The main axiom requires a convex combination of a disagreement point and the corresponding solution point to give rise to that same solution point. Further, we describe how the disagreement point approach can be applied to other bargaining solutions. The main result of the latter part is a first characterization of the so-called Continuous Raiffa solution.
Keywords: games; n-person cooperative; Nash bargaining solutions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Working Paper: Characterizing the Nash and Raiffa bargaining solutions by disagreement point axioms (1991)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inm:ormoor:v:16:y:1991:i:3:p:447-461
Access Statistics for this article
More articles in Mathematics of Operations Research from INFORMS Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Matthew Walls ().