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The Consistent Coalitional Value

Gustavo Bergantiños and Juan Vidal-Puga

Mathematics of Operations Research, 2005, vol. 30, issue 4, 832-851

Abstract: We describe a value for nontransferable utility games with coalition structure. This value coincides with the consistent value for trivial coalition structures, and with the Owen value for transferable utility games with coalition structure. Furthermore, we present two characterizations: the first one using properties of balanced contributions and the second one using a consistency property.

Keywords: NTU games; coalition structure; consistency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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Handle: RePEc:inm:ormoor:v:30:y:2005:i:4:p:832-851