Values of Large Games II: Oceanic Games
J. W. Milnor and
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J. W. Milnor: Rand Corporation, 1700 Main Street, Santa Monica, California 90406
Mathematics of Operations Research, 1978, vol. 3, issue 4, 290-307
A value theory is developed for voting games in which a sizable fraction or the total vote is controlled by a few major players and the rest is distributed among a continuous infinity of individually insignificant minor players. The latter are referred to collectively as an “ocean,” to suggest the total lack of order or cohesion that is assumed.
Keywords: game theory; continuum of players; oceanic games; weighted-majority games; voting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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