Information Conditions, Communication and General Equilibrium
Pradeep Dubey and
Mathematics of Operations Research, 1981, vol. 6, issue 2, 186-189
It is shown that if the information sets of one game are a refinement of the information sets of the other, then the set of pure strategy equilibrium points of the game with less information is contained within the set of pure strategy equilibrium points of the game with more information.
Keywords: noncooperative games; information; equilibrium points (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: Information Conditions, Communication and General Equilibrium (1977)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inm:ormoor:v:6:y:1981:i:2:p:186-189
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